Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a twosided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.
Introduction
This paper provides a new theoretical explanation for the following empirical regularities: (i) Minimum wages that are "low" (close to the wage without government intervention, for the relevant labor service) have negligible or even positive employment e¤ects. (ii) Minimum wages that are "high" have negative employment e¤ects. 1 Many theoretical explanations of the employment e¤ects of minimum wages have focused on the demand side of the labor market, with …rms'employment decisions playing the central role in determining employment (e.g. the monopsony theory of Manning 2003) . Our paper provides an alternative, observationally distinct, model of how minimum wages a¤ect employment, based on a two-sided labor market ‡ow model which makes both …rms'job o¤er and workers'job acceptance decisions explicit. We show analytically that larger wages depress …rms'job o¤er rates, but raise workers'acceptance rates. Under su¢ ciently low minimum wages, the latter e¤ect may dominate the former.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a dynamic model of two-sided selection in terms of optimizing decisions of …rms and workers. Section 3 provides comparative statics on the employment e¤ect of minimum wages and explores the intuition underlying our results. In Section 4 we parametrize the model and present numerical results. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We use the dynamic incentive model by Brown, Merkl and Snower (2014) containing two-sided selection in the labor market. In the context of conventional calibrations, this model fares better than the standard matching model in reproducing the volatilities of major labor market variables. 2 The sequence of decisions in our model may be summarized as follows. First, once a contact between workers and …rms has been made, two types of heterogeneous matchspeci…c idiosyncratic shocks are revealed. Firms learn about di¤erent suitability of workers, workers learn about the disagreeability of work. Second, …rms make their job o¤er decisions and the households make their job acceptance decisions, based on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks and anticipating the wage. Because the wage is set after the employment decisions, the match-speci…c idiosyncratic random shocks are already sunk when the wage is set (for a similar assumption see Pissarides 2009 ). Thus, wages do not to depend on the idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. we focus on those cases where the exogenously set minimum wage is binding and thus, has an e¤ect on labor market outcomes.
We assume that the pro…t generated by a particular worker at a new match 3 is subject to a match-speci…c random shock " t in period t, which is meant to capture idiosyncratic variations in workers' suitability for the available jobs. The random shock " t is positive and iid across workers, with a stable probability density function G " (" t ). Let the corresponding cumulative distribution be J " (" t ) : 4 In each period of analysis, a new value of " t is realized for each worker. The average productivity of each worker is a, the wage is w 5 , the unemployment bene…ts are b and the hiring cost is h.
The …rm maximizes the present value of its expected pro…t, with a time discount factor . The pro…t generated by an entrant (a newly hired worker), after the random cost term " t is observed, is
where the superscript "E" stands for entrant and
where the superscript "I"stands for an incumbent worker, is the time discount factor and is the exogenous separation rate. The …rm's "job o¤er incentive"(its payo¤ from hiring a worker) is the di¤er-ence between its gross pro…t 6 from hiring an entrant worker and its pro…t from not doing so (namely, zero):
The …rm o¤ers this job to a worker whenever that worker generates positive pro…t: " t < E . Thus, the job o¤er rate is
The worker faces a discrete choice of whether or not to work. Her idiosyncratic disutility of work e¤ort at a given job is e t , a random variable, which is iid, with a stable probability density function G e (e t ), known to the worker. The corresponding cumulative distribution is J e (e t ). The worker's utility is linear in consumption and work e¤ort. She consumes all her income.
The incumbent employed worker's expected present value of utility from working N t (e t ) for a given work e¤ort e is N t = w t e t + E t (1 )
where E t N t+1 is the expected present value of utility of the following period (before the realized value of the shock e t+1 is known):
The expected present value utility from unemployment is
An unemployed worker's expected "work incentive" t is the expected gross di¤erence 7 between these two utility streams:
which is
Thus the unemployed accepts a job o¤er when e t < t . Consequently, the job acceptance rate is
The change in employment is the di¤erence between the number of hires and the number of …res. The number of hires depends the job o¤er probability and the job acceptance probability (contacts are assumed to be made with probability one). Thus the match probability ( t ) is the product of the job o¤er probability ( t ) and the job acceptance probability ( t ):
The resulting employment dynamics equation is
Comparative Statics and Intuition
We now proceed to analyze the e¤ect of a minimum wage on the …rm's job o¤er and the worker's acceptance decision and thereby, on employment. The …rm's job o¤er incentive (Eq. 3) and job o¤er rate (Eq. 4) in the steady state are
and
respectively. Di¤erentiating with respect to the wage yields
Thus, higher wages depress the job o¤er rate. So when a minimum wage is introduced (or rises), …rms make job o¤ers only to workers with su¢ ciently low idiosyncratic costs. Analogously, the worker's work incentive (Eq. 8) and job acceptance rate (Eq. 10) in the steady state are
respectively. Di¤erentiating the job acceptance rate with respect to wage yields
This expression is positive: higher wages increase the job acceptance rate. 9 The reason is that workers with a comparatively large idiosyncratic disutility shock, who were previously disinclined to accept work, are now willing to accept it because the higher wage raises the value of work relative to unemployment.
By the matching rate Eq. (11), an increase in the minimum wage accordingly has two countervailing e¤ects, one on the job o¤er rate ( @ @w < 0) and one on the job acceptance rate ( @ @w > 0):
Which of these two e¤ects dominate is an empirical issue.
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8 See Appendix 6.1 for details. 9 The reason is that the denominator is positive, as well as the numerator (since @ @w < 0). 1 0 Disentangling the household and …rm decisions on the separation margin will imply analoguous e¤ects of …ring and quits, namely that a binding mimimum wage will increase …rings but decrease quits with ambuguous results. We do not focus on this analoguous mechanism here, since our aim is to establish this mechanism, further quantitative investigations are left for future research.
Parametrization and Numerical Analysis
We now show that for minimum wages that are su¢ ciently low, their expansionary e¤ect on the job acceptance rate may dominate their contractionary e¤ect on the job o¤er rate. However, for minimum wages that are su¢ ciently high, the contractionary e¤ect on the job o¤er rate dominates.
To address this issue, we begin with the following parametrization. For choosing steady state targets for the low wage sector, we use Blau and Robins' (1990) evidence for average o¤ers per contact and acceptances per contact and per o¤er.
11 Accordingly, we set the match probability , which is the probability that a unemployed worker …nds a new job within one period, to 12%, the job o¤er rate to 17%, and equation 11 then yields a job acceptance rate of 71%. 12 The unemployment rate u = 1 n is set to 8:96% (as in Cairo and Cajner 2011). According to the employment dynamics equation, we obtain an exogenous separation rate of 1:2%.
Next, with reference to the empirical literature, we consider a plausible range of of labor demand elasticities [-1,-0,25] 13 and labor supply elasticities [0. 1, 0.6] 14 . In the context of our model, we use the steady state employment equation (n = + ) to calculate the labor demand and labor supply elasticities, by holding the household-side and …rm-side employment activities constant, respectively. Table 1 : Maximum wage increase without job losses under di¤erent labor supply and labor demand elasticities. Table 1 shows the largest minimum wage that does not reduce employment, for di¤erent combinations of the labor supply and labor demand elasticities. Under the lowest labor demand elasticity (-0.25), for most labor supply elasticities wage increases of up to 14.3% above the wage without government intervention are possible without job losses, i.e. with positive employment e¤ects. The 1 1 The data used by the authors is from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP) baseline household survey. We use the values for unemployed workers. number shrinks to 7.1% for a labor demand elasticity that is twice as large. Furthermore, observe that a minimum wage without job losses is only possible for a smaller range of supply elasticities. Intuitively, a larger labor demand elasticity leads to a quantitatively stronger reaction of the job o¤er rate. When the job o¤er reaction is su¢ ciently large (i.e. for demand elasticities of -0.75 and -1), the job acceptance e¤ect cannot compensate for this (under conventional labor supply elasticities). For lower labor demand elasticities, the job acceptance e¤ect is dominant for small minimum wage increases. But after some moderate increase of the minimum wage, the job acceptance rate (which is calibrated to 71%) reaches its upper bound of 100%. Thus, the job acceptance e¤ect is no longer at work and the job o¤er e¤ect starts dominating. 16 In other words, the labor supply elasticity does not matter any more, because further increases of the job acceptance rate (due to the minimum wage) are impossible. Note, however, that the quantitative response is di¤erent for wage increases below the threshold. With a labor demand elasticity of 0:25, a wage increase of 5% leads, for example, to an employment increase of 1:8%, 1:5% and 1:0% with a labor supply elastsicity of 0:6, 0:5 and 0:4 respectively.
While a more detailed empirical investigation is required in the future, our analysis shows that minimum wages increases up to 14% are conceivable without job losses. This is is a similar magnitude to the minimum wage increases analyzed in Card and Krueger (1994).
Conclusion
We present a new channel for the analysis of minimum wages. Our model, which disentangles household and …rm decisions, complements the existing literature by outlining a mechanism that is absent in standard search and matching models. We show analytically that larger wages depress …rms' job o¤er rates, but raise workers' acceptance rates. Under moderate minimum wages, the latter e¤ect may dominate the former. Obviously, there are other channels that prevent negative e¤ects of a moderate minimum wage (e.g. monopsony power). However, our numerical analysis illustrates that our job acceptance e¤ect alone is quantitatively meaningful. Thus, it is certainly of interest for future research to combine di¤erent theoretical e¤ects and to disentangle the job o¤er and job acceptance e¤ects in labor market ‡ow data. 
given that @ @w = @ @w + @ @w ;
this yields
Thus, For e.g. deriving the labor demand elasticity, we keep the household side constant, i.e. 
